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What Should the Developing Countries Do in the Context of the 
Current Impasse of the Doha Round?
* 
Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern 
University of Michigan 
I.  Introduction 
If the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations fails, the biggest losers will be 
developing countries.  In this paper we argue why this is the case and examine various 
options that may be available to developing countries either to avert or to deal with this 
failure.   
After a brief look in Section II at the history of negotiations that brought us to the 
current impasse, we begin by examining in Section III the commonalities and differences 
in the interests of developing countries in the negotiations.  These depend mostly on the 
sectors in which they export, either to developed countries or to each other.  Their 
interests in reducing trade barriers and subsidies in developed countries are mostly either 
coincident or non-conflicting, but their interests in reducing barriers among themselves 
sometimes put them at odds.  Nonetheless, we are encouraged by their recent efforts to 
negotiate collectively.  It is important that the Group of Twenty and other such groups not 
limit their cooperation to pressuring developed countries for liberalization, but also that 
                                                           
* This paper builds on an outline that John Whalley intended to use for a paper for this project, and we are 
grateful to him for permitting us to follow his lead.  We are also grateful to him for comments on an earlier 
draft, as well as to Riccardo Faini and Drew Brown who provided comments.  And we are particularly 
indebted to Bruce Blonigen, who enlisted us to write this paper and gave us detailed suggestions for its 
revision. they work among their members to secure their own liberalization.  Without that, the 
Round cannot succeed. 
A confounding factor can be found in the preferences that some developing 
countries already enjoy from developed countries.  They are well aware that multilateral 
liberalization will erode these preferences, giving them incentive to stand in the way of a 
successful negotiation. 
In Section IV we examine the role of developing countries in the structure of past 
and current negotiations.  In the past, their role has been limited largely because they 
were exempted from making “concessions” and the willingness of developed countries to 
provide “special and differential treatment.”  Special treatment is still needed, but not in 
that form, which has mainly had the effect of sidelining developing countries from 
getting the benefits of previous liberalizations.  What is needed now is for developing-
country liberalization to be met by resources from developed countries and international 
institutions to assist them in opening their markets. 
Finally, in Section V we examine and evaluate several options that may be 
available to developing countries both within and outside the context of multilateral 
negotiations.  The first and most promising option is for developing countries to act 
collectively to reinvigorate the WTO and the Doha Round negotiations.  But for this 
purpose it is essential that they declare themselves willing to open their markets 
significantly in return for liberalization by developed countries.  Not only is this 
necessary in order for the Round to succeed, it is crucial for developing countries to 
recognize that it is they, not the developed countries, who stand to gain the most from a 
successful round. 
  4If the Doha Round does not succeed, and perhaps even if it does, developing 
countries have the option of entering into regional and/or bilateral arrangements, either 
among themselves or with large developed counties.  We argue that there is little benefit 
for such arrangements among themselves, and we also see dangers in arrangements with 
large and rich countries because of the asymmetries in their leverage over the many 
nontrade issues that routinely enter such agreements.  Nonetheless, we see such regional 
agreements as making small but positive steps in the direction of multilateral free trade.  
These steps could be improved, however, if such arrangements were designed to permit 
easier expansion to include more countries, as well as rules of origin that would be more 
all encompassing. 
We also consider several other options in Section V.  Aid for Trade is a small but 
obviously desirable initiative that is being encouraged both within the Doha Round and 
by the international financial institutions.  Another option is negotiation of focused 
initiatives in sub-areas, such as a single industry or category of trade.  We argue, 
however, that these are of doubtful benefit to developing countries, since they are likely 
to lack the potential for tradeoffs that would expand their benefits beyond the immediate 
gains from trade.  For the same reason, we do not encourage unilateral liberalization by 
developing countries whose trade barriers are already low or moderate.  High-barrier 
countries could gain from unilateral liberalization, of course, but we argue that, once 
barriers are low, the benefits from further unilateral liberalization are outweighed by the 
benefits of using those barriers as bargaining chips to secure greater market access 
abroad. 
  5II.  How We Reached the Impasse 
The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations began in 2001, with high hopes that 
real progress would be made both by and for developing countries, for the first time in 
the history of such rounds.  Although many issues were on the table, the central issues 
were also the most difficult to address:  developed country protection and subsidies in 
industries of interest to developing countries, especially agriculture; and developing 
country tariffs on non-agricultural products and other restrictions on market access, 
including in services.  In the event, these issues have proven so difficult that the 
negotiations have been characterized more by their lack of progress than their progress.  
At the Cancun Ministerial in 2003, the meeting ended without even the beginnings of a 
negotiating text agreed upon.  Such a text was achieved during the following year, but the 
next ministerial, in Hong Kong in 2005, ended in success only because the criteria for 
success were reduced almost to the level of being meaningless.  In July 2006, WTO 
Director General Pascal Lamy finally acknowledged that the negotiations were getting 
nowhere and would fail to meet the deadline imposed by the expiration of U.S. Trade 
Promotion Authority in mid-2007.  He therefore suspended the negotiations.  Today, 
although various efforts are being made to revive them, the negotiations remain in a state 
of suspended animation.  Developing countries must ask whether their interests continue 
to lie with the uncertain future of the multilateral initiatives, or should instead be found in 
alternative approaches to integration with international markets. 
  The Doha Round was never really about development per se, even though it may 
have been marketed as such.  But it is nonetheless true that developing countries as a 
group may be the biggest losers from the failure of the Round.  The Doha Round was 
  6christened the Doha Development Agenda, not because its purpose was to achieve the 
policies that would stimulate development, but because it was intended to pursue the 
usual objective of trade liberalization with the unusual proviso that developing countries 
would not be sidelined or put at a disadvantage.  Trade liberalization may well be 
necessary for economic development, but it is hardly sufficient.  The best that could have 
been hoped for from the Doha Round was therefore to remove barriers to development. 
  Those barriers exist – and may continue to exist, due to the Doha Round’s failure 
– because developing countries have failed to participate in previous negotiating rounds 
where they might have pushed to open markets to their exports.  Instead, first because 
they were late to sign onto the GATT, and then later because they sought and were 
granted “special and differential treatment” that exempted them from the negotiations, 
they sat on the sidelines while developed countries negotiated downward those trade 
barriers that it was in their mutual interest to eliminate.  Developing countries benefited 
from these negotiations, to some extent, as their most-favored-nation (MFN) status 
allowed them the same market access that was granted to others.  But this was usually not 
in the sectors where developing countries themselves were most able to export.  As a 
result, the world today is characterized by its highest tariffs in developed countries on 
goods exported by developing countries, both labor-intensive manufactures such as 
textiles and apparel and various agricultural products.  The latter are also subject to 
significant subsidies provided by developed country governments to their agricultural 
interests.  In addition, and also because they did not participate actively in previous 
rounds, many developing countries also have high tariffs on numerous imports.  If the 
Doha Round is not revived, this unsatisfactory state of affairs will continue, and the 
  7developing countries of the world will continue to be hobbled in their efforts to escape 
poverty. 
  By remaining exempt from the negotiations, developing countries not only failed 
to secure the benefits of foreign liberalization on their exports.  They also failed to secure 
the benefits from the liberalization they might themselves have undertaken, although 
some countries did, eventually, see the benefits of liberalization and did it unilaterally.  
But by avoiding the negotiated commitment to liberalize, they also avoided the 
international discipline that might have assisted them in achieving reforms of internal 
policies as well. 
III.  Trade Interests of Developing Countries 
A.  Developing countries have a shared interest in exporting 
The principal interest of any developing country in the context of trade negotiations is 
market access for its exports.  Tariffs and other barriers to developing-country exports 
have always been very restrictive and have prevented these countries from harnessing 
their comparative advantages to the cause of economic growth.  Indeed, it has been 
common for developing countries to seek to exploit a newly found source of comparative 
advantage, only to be met by new barriers to their exports as soon as these exports 
become large enough to be noticed by those who compete with them abroad.  In that 
sense, therefore, developing countries share a common interest:  reducing trade barriers in 
the rest of the world, both developed and developing, against their exports. 
  This shared interest is often illusory, however, since developing countries are 
themselves diverse and export many different things, sometimes to each other.  And 
  8when they export to each other, the interest in exporting conflicts with a second major 
goal that many developing countries profess, even though it is contrary to what 
economists view as their interest:  restricting imports.  Very much like the developed 
countries whose protectionist instincts have to some extent been whittled down through 
earlier rounds of trade negotiations, developing countries seek to protect their domestic 
industries even in sectors where other developing countries may have an advantage.   
When that happens, the export interests of the developing world come into conflict. 
  Fortunately, this divergence of interests is not as severe as it might be.  In the 
realm of manufacturing, many developing countries tend by definition to be labor 
abundant and to have their comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods such as 
textiles and apparel.  This means that they compete with one another as exporters – a fact 
that may pose its own problems as we will note in a moment – but at least they have a 
shared interest in reducing barriers to the importing of such products in the developed 
world. 
  Their export interests are much more likely to diverge when based on something 
other than labor abundance, most obviously in agriculture or other natural-resource based 
industries.  Here their interests tend not to be in direct conflict, in the sense that some 
import what others export, but rather that they care about different things.  Thailand’s 
exporters of rice are unlikely to care very much about the barriers that Argentina’s 
exporters of beef face in the developed world.  Furthermore, some natural resource 
products face little competition in the developed world and therefore face low trade 
barriers, while others are heavily protected.  Getting oil-exporting developing countries to 
cooperate with exporters of both beef and rice may be difficult.  However, it may not be 
  9impossible, especially in the context of a multilateral negotiation where broad reductions 
in trade barriers on many products simultaneously are being considered. 
B.  Competition among developing countries does not justify protection 
  A more serious conflict may arise not over what the developing countries are able 
to export, but over how much.  The asymmetry in size between many small developing 
countries, on the one hand, and China and India on the other, leads the former to fear the 
effects of international competition in precisely the labor-intensive sectors where all of 
them export.  The perception is that China, particularly, has so much cheap labor that 
other labor-abundant countries cannot possibly compete, especially now that China is a 
member of the WTO and is getting MFN treatment.  In fact, of course, China was getting 
such treatment already before it joined the WTO, and the increase in competition with 
China is more a by-product of its remarkable growth since transitioning to a market 
economy.  And like other fears of international competition that have existed for two 
centuries, the fear of China is largely misguided and certainly overblown.  Small 
countries are already beginning to find that they can compete successfully in some 
products even as they may have to move out of others.  The process of adjustment as 
comparative advantages evolve can of course be painful, but the view that countries 
cannot compete at all with China and India is surely false. 
C.  Some developing countries face erosion of preferences 
  Another conflict that may arise among developing country interests stems from 
asymmetries in the policies that have confronted them in the past.  In the presence of 
largely high barriers to their exports, some developing countries have prospered from 
  10special treatment by particular developed countries as markets for their exports.  Often 
based on former colonial relationships, these countries have been given preferential 
access to particular Northern markets.  As multilateral trade barriers have been reduced, 
and as negotiations proceed toward reducing them further, these countries see themselves 
losing their markets to other developed countries who were previously not favored.   
Unlike the competition with China, which may be a problem more of perception than 
reality, this one is very real.  The trade preferences enjoyed by members of the Lomé 
Convention, for example, have allowed high-cost industries to survive, and the extent of 
the preference is a measure of the cost disadvantage that they will experience when the 
preferences are eroded or removed.  That does not mean that such countries have no 
comparative advantage or the ability to gain from trade.  But it does mean that they are 
likely to have to transfer resources from these artificially favored sectors to those in 
which they can compete without the preferences, and that they will lose the benefits that 
the preference provided.  In some cases, one hopes, the benefits from the preferences 
have been wisely used in the past to invest in the physical and human capital needed for 
these countries now to move into other industries without preferences.  But there is no 
doubt that there are other countries where this has failed to happen.  For these latter 
countries, the failure of the Doha Round may be their only hope of continuing to live in 
the style to which they have become accustomed. 
D.  Developing countries can gain by cooperating 
  In sum, although the trade interests of developing countries are not by any means 
coincident, it does seem that many of them share sufficiently common interests in 
reducing trade barriers, at least in the developed world, that they should be able to 
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countries were able to come together in what now seems to be called the Group of 
Twenty (G20) in Cancun, and that they have continued to cohere in the years since then.  
It is of course discouraging that they are resisting liberalization of their own trade 
barriers, but that is also understandable.  And perhaps it is too much to expect them to 
give in on this before they get a clearer signal from the United States and the European 
Union that their trade barriers and subsidies will be given up. 
  An alternative that has to be considered, especially if the Doha Round fails to 
restart, is for developing countries to pursue trade liberalization by other means, most 
obviously by bilateral and regional trade agreements.  The problem here is that such 
agreements, if they attempt to harness their common interests by negotiating among 
themselves, simply fail to address the most severe impediments that they face in 
international trade, the protection by developed countries.  Alternatively, if they negotiate 
directly with developed countries, it is perhaps unlikely that their developed counterparts 
will willingly negotiate with them as a group.  Although the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas was conceived by the United States as precisely such an arrangement, it never 
made much progress, and the United States most recently has seemed to prefer 
negotiating with individual developing countries (or with small groups, when the 
countries themselves are very small, as in the case of Central America).  That preference 
may be accounted for by a desire on the part of the US to have a greater advantage in the 
negotiations so as to achieve other objectives than simple trade liberalization. 
  It might well be very much in the interest of significant regional groups of 
developing countries to insist on negotiating with the US and EU en masse, precisely so 
  12as to undermine this advantage that the larger players wish to exert.  However, it seems 
unlikely that they will get agreement to do this, even among themselves, since the larger 
developed countries can offer incentives for them to negotiate separately.
1 
IV.  Structure of the Negotiations 
A.  Developing countries have played only a small role in past negotiations 
In the past, trade negotiations within the GATT and WTO have been conducted primarily 
between the largest negotiating blocs – the US and the EU – whose agreement when it 
was finally reached was then sold with minor modifications to the other participants.  
Smaller countries might press for particular concessions, for themselves or for a like-
minded group such as the Cairns Group, but in practice that did not usually get very 
much.  A smaller country might also play a larger role by acting as an intermediary 
between the United States and European Union, but that too gave only limited benefit.  
Most countries more or less had to accept whatever deal the United States and European 
Union had reached on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  And the pressure to take it became 
extreme. 
  This somewhat understates the role of developing countries, however.  Each of 
the many issues that enters a round of negotiations is considered within a negotiating 
group, which includes delegates from many more countries than just the United States 
and European Union.  Developing countries do sit at the table in these groups, as they do 
in the “green room” discussions that attempt to reach final agreement on particular issues.  
These groups are assembled on a somewhat ad hoc basis by the Director General, and 
                                                           
1 See Evenett (2005) for a model of how dominant countries can get smaller countries to compete for access 
to their markets. 
  13some have viewed this process as inadequately representing the interests of developing 
countries.  But the fact remains that a selection of them are at the table, expressing their 
views, and they certainly have had a nontrivial affect on the outcomes of the negotiations, 
if not a major one. 
B.  The “Development Agenda” should provide assistance to liberalization, not 
exemption from it 
  The official “development” orientation of the Doha Development Agenda might 
be thought to represent an example of their interest.  In fact, however, it seems likely that 
the stress on development in the Doha Declaration was more a reaction to the post-9/11 
need by developed countries to accommodate others than any particular push by the 
developing countries themselves. 
  In fact, there is real question about the extent to which trade negotiations should 
have such a development orientation.  As we have already noted, previous rounds had 
created impediments to development by leaving developing countries on the periphery of 
the negotiations, and it is important that this be corrected.  But it is within neither the 
purview nor the expertise of trade negotiators to implement many of the changes that are 
necessary for poverty reduction and economic growth by developing countries.  The best 
that they can do is seek to remove impediments.  That is an important objective, but if it 
is advertised as solving the manifold problems of developing countries, it can only raise 
expectations that will be disappointed. 
  That said, one might ask whether the current trade round, if it is able to proceed, 
should include a bias in favor of developing countries.  The fact that previous rounds 
have arguably been biased against them, mostly by exclusion, may suggest that this 
  14would be appropriate.  Unfortunately, such a bias would undoubtedly be interpreted as 
meaning that developed countries should make greater “concessions” than developing 
countries, lowering their trade barriers and removing their subsidies while developing 
countries do little of that themselves.  As economists we know, however, that such a bias 
in their favor is actually against their interests and is really a bias in the opposite 
direction.  Trade negotiations are about giving countries external incentives to implement 
painful but desirable policy changes that they would otherwise be unable, politically, to 
achieve.  Seeming to “favor” developing countries by exempting them from this process 
is not a favor at all. 
  The trick, therefore, is to find additional ways to address developing country 
interests without exempting them from trade liberalization themselves.  This was the 
intent expressed in the Doha Declaration, where in numerous places developing countries 
were identified for special assistance in implementing whatever agreements might be 
achieved.  Unfortunately, the WTO lacks any mechanism for providing such assistance, 
and it is unclear how a Doha Round agreement, even if it were achieved and were to 
include such promises, would actually deliver on them. 
  From this perspective, renewed progress in the Doha Round may depend on 
initiatives outside the WTO to mobilize such resources for assistance.  A credible 
commitment by the US, the EU, and other developed countries, as well as by 
international financial institutions, to provide greater resources for implementing 
liberalization in developing countries, might be just the incentive needed to get them to 
be more forthcoming in the negotiations.  The Aid for Trade initiative, which we will 
discuss further below, is a step in this direction. 
  15V.  Options for Developing Countries 
In this section we discuss several options that might be considered for developing 
countries that are disappointed with the current impasse in the Doha Round negotiations. 
A.  Developing countries should act collectively to reinvigorate the WTO 
Given that, in our view, a successful conclusion to the Doha Round would offer great 
benefits to developing countries, the first option that must be considered is whether they 
can play a role in getting it back on track.  The answer is surely yes, in that it has been 
their refusal to offer meaningful trade liberalization that has led, along with stubbornness 
on the part of the US and the EU, to the current impasse. 
  In order to reverse that, it will first be necessary for a number of major developing 
countries to recognize that trade liberalization is in their interest.  Economists’ arguments 
to that end have largely fallen on deaf ears, or at least uninfluential ones.  The likelihood 
in the near term of greater understanding of the benefits, not just the costs, of reducing 
trade barriers is probably too small to count on.  Somewhat more likely would be a 
greater appreciation of the benefits to be had from liberalization abroad, making it seem 
worth the cost of their own liberalization.  In fact the emphasis by the G20 and other 
developing country groups (such as the cotton exporting African countries) on the need to 
change developed-country policies suggests that the costs of these policies are becoming 
better understood.  It may even be the case that the costs of these policies are being 
overstated – agricultural subsidies, after all, harm only those countries who are net 
exporters of the subsidized products, while they benefit those who are net importers.  But 
if exaggeration of the costs can help to enhance the perceived benefits of liberalization, 
perhaps to the point that the developing world is ready to “pay” something to achieve it, 
  16then it may serve as a tool to unite that world in a willingness to participate in the 
negotiations more constructively. 
  A final possibility is to rebalance the developing world’s understanding of the 
relative gains from liberalization in North and South.  The perception right now is 
understandably that the greatest beneficiaries from liberalization are the rich countries 
and especially their large corporations that are seeking to extend their reach into 
developing country markets.  This perception is enhanced every time a rich-country 
spokesperson harangues the developing world for its failure to cooperate.  In fact, 
however, precisely because they are rich, the developed countries already enjoy much of 
the benefits from trade that they will ever achieve, and extending trade liberalization to 
new markets will benefit them relatively little.  By the same token, the rich-country 
multinational corporations do indeed seek to profit from selling in new markets, but the 
size of their operations in the rich world suggests that these benefits too, important as 
they may be, are relatively small. 
  In contrast, the developing world stands to gain far more from liberalization, 
including their own.  Their markets are small and seriously distorted in ways that 
international competition can readily correct.  The trade barriers that they both impose 
themselves and face on the part of others cover a much larger part of their trade than 
these same barriers account for in the developed world.  In our earlier work on the 
NAFTA, for example, we found that the economic gains to Mexico, as a share of their 
GDP, were an order of magnitude larger than the gains to the United States and Canada.
2  
Thus the perception that trade liberalization is mostly a benefit to the rich world is simply 
wrong. 
                                                           
2 See Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1992). 
  17  This matters, because many in developing countries are suspicious of entreaties 
from rich-country governments for them to go along with trade negotiations, thinking that 
the motive is to benefit the rich, not the poor.  They may even be correct about the motive 
– we suspect that many in rich countries do believe that their constituents will reap the 
lion’s share of the benefits from liberalization.  But that belief is incorrect.  In fact, if the 
Doha Round never recovers and if trade liberalization comes to a halt indefinitely around 
the world, the harm to the rich countries will be minimal.  They have already achieved 
most of their gains from trade, and unless the process of liberalization is actually 
reversed, they will be just fine.  It is the poor countries that stand to lose most, by far, 
from this impasse. 
  So we must somehow convey this message to opinion leaders in developing 
countries.  They must come to understand that the Doha Round is not primarily a rich-
country game, played by and for the people and corporations of developed countries.  
Rather, after half a century of trade liberalization that sidelined developing countries, it is 
now, for the first time, a game that must include and will primarily benefit the poor 
countries.  If it fails, there will in fact be plenty of people in the rich world who will 
breathe a sigh of relief. 
B.  All countries should encourage and cooperate in Aid for Trade initiatives 
In recent years, there has been a growing awareness that developing countries’ 
participation in international trade is hindered, not just by the barriers put in their way by 
countries with whom they might trade, but also by physical and institutional deficiencies 
within their own economies that make it difficult to export and import.  Thus has grown 
the recognition that assistance to these countries should include “aid for trade.”  This, as 
  18stated in a recent report from the IMF and World Bank (2005), is “provision of assistance 
by the international community to help countries address supply-side constraints to their 
participation in international markets and to cope with transitional adjustment costs from 
liberalization.”
3 
  Such aid for trade is an explicit part of the Doha Round negotiations, but if the 
Doha Round does not proceed, it is even more essential that aid for trade initiatives be 
pursued.  The IMF and World Bank are committed to providing such assistance, but as 
always, developing countries themselves need to play an active role in seeking this 
assistance and making sure that it is tailored appropriately to their needs.  Fortunately, 
this is one area where resistance to change ought to be minimal, since the benefits to 
developing countries are much easier to see and understand than the benefits from trade 
itself.  And even though aid for trade, if it succeeds, will lower the costs of trade and thus 
have many of the same effects as tariff reductions, that fact may be less apparent to 
import-competing interests and thus not excite the same degree of opposition. 
  The bottleneck instead is likely to come from the providers of such aid, who bear 
its budgetary cost.  Fortunately, there seem to be plenty of initiatives available both from 
the international financial institutions and from rich countries individually that have 
already been funded.  What is needed now is for developing countries to submit well-
conceived proposals for the use of these funds, then to make sure that the projects are 
carried through. 
                                                           
3 The report goes on to list the following elements of aid for trade:  “technical assistance; capacity building; 
institutional reform; investments in trade related infrastructure; and assistance to offset adjustment costs, 
such as fiscal support to help countries make the transition from tariffs to other sources of revenue.” 
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worth pursuing 
The obvious alternative to multilateral trade liberalization is for individual developing 
countries to enter into trade agreements with other countries or groups of countries.  The 
current wave of regional trade agreements, which began with US negotiations, first with 
Canada and then with Mexico to form the NAFTA, was itself in part a response to failure 
of multilateral negotiations, progress on which was then stalled in the Uruguay Round.  
Even though the Uruguay Round ultimately finished successfully, subsequent difficulties 
first in starting a new round at Seattle in 1999, and later in pursuing the negotiations of 
the Doha Round, have undoubtedly contributed to the willingness and often eagerness of 
almost every country in the world to enter into such agreements.  Today almost 300 of 
them have been notified to the WTO. 
  Economists are largely in agreement that such preferential trading arrangements 
are, at best, inferior to multilateral liberalization, and that they have the potential to be 
distinctly harmful, even to their participants and certainly to outsiders.  That makes it 
difficult for us to provide guidance on the form that such agreements should take.   
Nonetheless, if multilateral liberalization turns out not to be an option, then many 
developing countries will undoubtedly take the preferential route. 
i.  Developing countries should choose their partners carefully 
  If they do, then they must choose what sorts of partner countries they should 
select to negotiate with.  An obvious choice is to form free trade agreements (FTAs) with 
their neighbors, whoever they may be.  The economic case for doing so is not clear, but if 
  20one adds the desirability of making or maintaining peace with one’s neighbors, then such 
regional trade agreements probably make most sense. 
  Another choice of partner for some countries is between developed countries on 
the one hand, and other developing countries on the other.  The problem with FTAs 
among developing countries is that they are likely to involve competing exporters of 
many of the same products.  That means that the potential for trade among them is either 
minimal or likely to be particularly disruptive.  The same similarity of trade patterns also 
often exists among developed countries, which have quite successfully pursued economic 
integration especially in the European Union.  But there what appear to be common 
industries in fact often produce differentiated products, and there is ample scope for intra-
industry trade.  Such seems much less likely to be the case in FTAs among developing 
countries, who tend to find their comparative advantages in more standardized products. 
  This suggests that developing countries might better seek to form trade 
agreements with developed countries, such as the United States or European Union, as 
indeed a great many of them are currently doing.  In terms of the economics of trade 
alone, this seems a fruitful approach, since it opens import-competing industries in both 
parties to competition from comparative-advantage-based exports, but does so in a 
smaller way than might have been feared from multilateral liberalization.  Indeed, one 
can hope that such agreements will lead these import-competing industries to gradually 
shrink, thus over time reducing the resistance to broader liberalization. 
  The downside of such arrangements, however, is the extreme asymmetry between 
the two sides that negotiate them, one rich and the other poor.  This would not matter if 
FTAs consisted simply of reducing all tariffs to zero among themselves and nothing else.  
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will discuss in a moment, they typically carry all sorts of other baggage to protect labor 
and environmental standards, intellectual property rights, investment, and much else.   
These additional features of an FTA are not necessarily undesirable, but they sometimes 
are.  And whether desirable or not, they pretty much always operate in only one direction, 
constraining or requiring change in the policies of the developing country partner without 
any extra expectations at all of the developed country partner.  Thus, even though in 
principle trade agreements should be able to yield substantial net positive benefits for 
both parties, this asymmetry is likely to mean that the developing country partner is 
pushed to the lower limit of the benefits that it will accept, with the larger share going to 
the developed country. 
  We spoke above of the fear that multilateral trade liberalization might primarily 
benefit the developed world, and we argued that, for tariff liberalization at least, that fear 
was unfounded.  But when agreements extend well beyond the setting of tariffs into many 
other issues – as they do in FTAs even more than in the multilateral system – that fear 
may well be justified.  Indeed, one might suspect that some of the recalcitrance that we 
have seen on the part of developed country negotiators in the Doha Round may be 
intended to assure exactly this outcome. 
ii.  Free Trade Areas should be structured to approach and approximate 
multilateral free trade 
  FTAs will nonetheless continue to be negotiated between developed and 
developing countries, and we must then ask how they can be constructed so as to be most 
beneficial, or least harmful, to the developing-country partners.  The answer is to 
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trade.   
This means that, first, when overlapping FTAs are formed, with countries A and 
B both forming FTAs with country C, then they should more or less automatically form 
an FTA between A and B as well.  Without that, country C – which is often a developed 
country – gets to play the other two countries off against each other while being immune 
to such gaming itself. 
Second, when A, B, and C form FTAs of A&B, A&C, and B&C, they should 
specify the rules of origin of each bilateral FTA to allow the accumulation of content 
from each of the three countries.  Thus, if each of the bilateral FTAs requires, say, 30% 
local content to qualify for tariff-free access, then that 30% should be calculated to 
include content from all three of the countries. 
Once that is done, if the FTA were no more than a trade agreement, it would make 
most sense to redefine it as a single FTA encompassing all three countries.   
Unfortunately, as already noted, trade agreements are never this simple, and their other 
features may provide impediments to merging them, and even incentives not to do so.  
Developing countries should vigorously resist such features that cannot be easily 
extended to new members, however, as these are likely to be used as leverage against 
their interests by the more dominant partner. 
All of this advice is intended not just to allow FTAs to approximate multilateral 
free trade as far as is possible, but also to smooth the transition toward that ideal over 
time.  It is probably hopeless to ask for this, but we would advocate revising Article 
XXIV of the GATT/WTO to require that FTAs always permit new entrants, essentially at 
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would make it easier, not harder, for regions of free trade to expand.  Unfortunately, such 
a requirement would not be on the table for discussion even if Doha negotiations were 
proceeding.  And we can hardly hope that those who negotiate FTAs will impose it 
themselves, since members of FTAs always value the exclusivity of market access that 
their arrangement provides. 
All is not lost, however, even if bilateral and regional trade initiatives do become 
the dominant form of liberalization at the expense of further multilateral negotiations in 
the WTO.  A lively debate has raged in the economics literature between those who see 
regional liberalization as “stepping stones” toward multilateral free trade and those who 
see it as “stumbling blocks.”
4  We will not take a side in that debate, which has too many 
merits on both sides.  But it does seem clear from our own work that even though 
regionalism is distinctly inferior to multilateralism if it fails to lead to multilateral free 
trade, it does seem to be moving the world in the right direction.  Brown et al. (2006) and 
other papers cited therein report calculations of the effects of a considerable variety of 
FTAs, almost all of which yield net benefits to the world as a whole.  Table 1 shows a 
sample of the calculated welfare effects of FTAs formed by the United States and Japan 
with various trading partners on the participants, the rest of world, and the world as a 
whole.  In all cases, the global effects are positive, because the benefits to the 
participating countries far outweigh the (often negative) effects on outside countries. 
                                                           
4 Bhagwati’s (1991) terms, of course. 
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An alternative to negotiating broadly over many categories of trade but with a single 
country or a small group is to negotiate narrowly over trade in a single industry, perhaps 
with a larger group.  Developed countries have pursued this strategy, often successfully, 
as they have struck agreements over such industries as aircraft, finance, and 
telecommunications.  Conceivably developing countries could do the same. 
  Certainly, if developed countries do initiate such discussions, it may well be in the 
interests of developing countries to participate.  But for most industries, it seems unlikely 
that developing countries themselves could initiate such negotiations, except perhaps if 
an industry were of interest only to developing countries, both as exporters and as 
importers.  It seems doubtful though that many such industries may exist.  We therefore 
do not see much potential for a sectoral approach initiated by developing countries. 
  This leaves the question of whether developing countries should participate in 
sectoral negotiations initiated by developed countries.  Here we are skeptical.  Such 
negotiations are bound to occur only in sectors where the developed countries have 
interests as exporters.  This works fine among themselves, where with intra-industry trade 
they often can strive to open each other’s markets within the same sector.  But developing 
countries seldom are in this position.  If they participate in such negotiations, unless they 
merely act to block agreement, they will be pushed to open their own markets without 
getting anything in return. 
  Now we do not, of course, deny the benefits to developing countries of opening 
their markets to foreign exports, in any sector.  But if such sectoral negotiations proceed 
outside of a more comprehensive multilateral negotiation such as the Doha Round, they 
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but not the reverse.  That is too close to the situation in which we find ourselves today, 
after fifty years of trade rounds with developing countries playing little role.  It would be 
better, therefore, if they limited their negotiations to ones where tradeoffs across sectors 
are possible, either multilaterally or bilaterally. 
E.  Developing countries with high levels of protection stand to gain from 
unilateral liberalization 
For the same reason, we are also somewhat skeptical of unilateral liberalization, in some 
cases and by some countries.  It is not the case that unilateral liberalization is not 
beneficial; it surely is, as two centuries of international trade theory have convincingly 
established.  But if done alone, unilateral liberalization generates only the benefits from 
itself, not from any foreign liberalization that could have been secured in exchange 
through negotiation. 
  For small countries, that does not matter.  Their markets are not large enough for 
anyone except possibly a close neighbor to be willing to pay anything for market access.  
Even for large but very poor countries, that may be true as well.  But as some of the 
larger developing countries have made economic progress, and especially as they have 
begun to join together for negotiating purposes, their levels of protection have become 
bargaining chips that should be able to get them something in return. 
  Of course, if their tariffs are very high, then the harm that they do before they are 
negotiated downward is too costly to justify hanging on to them.  Countries with very 
high tariffs certainly should reduce them substantially and unilaterally, especially if 
negotiations for reciprocal liberalization do not seem to be forthcoming. 
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them in place as long as their exports confront protection abroad.  Without that, they may 
never be able to get those foreign tariffs removed. 
VI.  Conclusions 
Looking at the various options that we have discussed, it is clear that the most desirable 
alternative from the perspective of developing countries would definitely be for the Doha 
Round to be restarted and for it to proceed to a successful conclusion.  As time passes, 
however, this option seems less and less likely to happen, unless U.S. negotiating 
authority is extended beyond mid-2007.  But no progress will be made as long as 
developing countries continue to insist on offering nothing in exchange for the policy 
changes that they seek in the developed world.  They simply must accept that substantial 
trade liberalization is in their own interest, if not for the sake of the gains from trade that 
economists universally tout, then for the sake of the policy changes that they seek abroad.  
If they were to come to the negotiating table offering significant market access to 
developed country exporters, that might mobilize those exporters to push their own 
governments to be more forthcoming in the ways that everyone agrees would benefit 
developing countries – reducing subsidies and tariffs on developing country exports.   
Without such an offer on the table, it is only the protected and subsidized interests in the 
developed world that are paying attention to the negotiations, and they are successfully 
blocking any progress. 
  Of the other options we have discussed, we certainly favor the provision of aid for 
trade, whether or not it is done within the context of the Doha Round.  But useful as it 
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policies that distort trade in both the developed and developing worlds. 
  If the Doha Round does not restart, then we find ourselves somewhat more 
sympathetic to bilateral and regional initiatives than we would otherwise be.  Although 
not guaranteed to be beneficial, these initiatives do by and large seem to have moved the 
world in a positive, albeit very messy, direction.  Rather than condemn them, we would 
encourage that their terms be better designed so that they are more likely to lead us down 
a path toward more liberalization rather than less. 
  And finally, with or without the Doha Round, we encourage very small countries 
and those with high tariffs to reduce them unilaterally.  The harm they are causing to their 
own economies exceeds whatever benefits they may perceive for the beneficiaries within 
their countries, and this is also too high a cost to pay for negotiating chips that may 
someday buy them concessions abroad.  For large developing countries whose tariffs are 
already low or moderate in size, we suggest that they postpone reducing them further, 
that they join together to the extent possible, and that they then offer to eliminate these 
tariffs in exchange for whatever liberalization they can elicit from developed countries, 
either individually or, we hope, en masse. 
  28References 
Bhagwati, Jagdish.  1991.  The World Trading System at Risk.  Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press. 
Brown, Drusilla K., Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern.  1992.  "A North American 
Free Trade Agreement:  Analytical Issues and a Computational Assessment," The 
World Economy (January), pp. 11-29. 
Brown, Drusilla K., Kozo Kiyota, and Robert M. Stern.  2006.  “Computational Analysis 
of the Menu of U.S.-Japan Trade Policies,” The World Economy (June), pp. 805-
54. 
Evenett, Simon J.  2005.  “ ‘Competitive Liberalization’:  A Tournament Theory-Based 
Interpretation,” University of St. Gallen, September 13. 
IMF and World Bank.  2005.  “Doha Development Agenda and Aid for Trade,” Prepared 
by the Staffs of the IMF and World Bank, September 19.  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/091905.pdf 
  29 
Table 1 
Welfare Effects of Bilateral Negotiating Options for the  
United States and Japan (billions of dollars) 
 
United States and…  U.S.  Partner  Other  Global 
 Australia  19.4 5.4 −1.7 23.1
  Central America & Caribbean  17.3 5.3 −6.9 15.7
 Chile  6.9 1.2 −0.2 7.9
 Morocco  6.0 0.9 0.6  7.5
 Singapore  15.8 2.5 4.2  22.5
  Southern African Customs Union  9.6 2.2 0.0  11.8
 Thailand  17.1 5.6 −0.8 21.9
  Free Trade Area of the Americas  67.6 45.4 −3.6 109.4
          
Japan and …  Japan  Partner  Other  Global 
 Chile  2.8 0.9 −0.2 3.5
 Indonesia  10.7 1.7 −1.3 11.1
 Korea  18.7 2.2 −1.2 19.7
 Malaysia  10.5 0.3 −0.7 10.1
 Mexico  8.2 3.3 −0.9 10.6
 Philippines  2.2 0.5 0.3  3.0
 Singapore  5.0 0.6 1.1  6.7
 Thailand  19.5 −0.5 −5.5 13.5
 
Source:  Brown, Kiyota, and Stern (2006) 
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